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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Such a construction of the amended statute was challenged in the Su-
preme Court. In reversing the court of appeals in the Rufo and a com-
panion case, the court stated that the statute now provides for something
more than a review on merely issues of law as proclaimed in the Farrand
case. The Ohio Administrative Procedure Act, however, now provides
for an appeal which still falls short of a trial de novo. The common pleas
court is limited to an examination of the record of 'the hearing before
the administrative agency and such additional evidence as the court in its
discretion may allow to be presented upon the theory that it is newly
discovered:
The court must read and consider all the evidence offered by both
sides and must appraise all the evidence as to the credibility of the wit-
nesses, the probative character of the evidence and the weight thereof.
In other words, the court may reverse, vacate or modify the order of the
agency, unless it finds that it is supported by reliable, probative and sub-
stantial evidence and is in accordance with law.-'
Thus if the common pleas court cannot make a finding -that the agency's
order is supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence and is
in accordance with law, it is authorized to reverse, vacate or modify the
order of the agency.
Where there is a finding that the order of an agency subject to review
under these provisions is supported by reliable, probative and substantial
evidence, the common pleas court, in practice, must affirm the order if
it is otherwise in accordance with law, according to numerous court of
appeals decisions.2 8
MAURICE S. CU.LP
AGENCY
The Problem of the Borrowed Servant
A problem of frequent occurrence and considerable difficulty arises
where a servant is, at the tune of the accident, acting in some sense as a
servant of two masters. The typical case involves a general employer who
'Andrews v. Board of Liquor Control, 164 Ohio St. 275, 280, 131 N.E.2d 390, 393,
394 (1955)
'Quinn v. State Board of Real Estate Examiners, 137 N.E.2d 777 (Ohio App.
1956); Burgerr v. Board of Liquor Control, 135 N.E.2d 786 (Ohio App. 1955);
Abdoney v. Board of Liquor Control, 101 Ohio App. 57, 135 N.E.2d 775 (1955);
DiMatteo v. State, 130 N.E.2d 351 (Ohio App. 1955); Ross v. Board of Liquor
Control, 135 N.E.2d 629 (Ohio App. 1954); Shranko v. Board of Liquor Control,
134 N.E.2d 173 (Ohio App. 1953); Miecznikewski v. State, 135 N.E.2d 641 (Ohio
C.P. 1952)
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loans an employee to an independent contractor who is working for the
general employer. In a very real sense, the work of the employee benefits
both employers. Since one of the reasons for the rule of respondeat su-
pertor is to encourage safety discipline on the part of an employer, the
normal rule is that the employer which has control over the servant's
work is liable for his torts. The rule is difficult to apply in most cases,
because in fact both employers exercise some control. In spite of
the practice of divided control, the courts adopt the theory that control
is unitary and liability is fastened on one employer or the other, but not
both.'
The classic case illustrating the application of the above principles is
Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson,2 where the general employer loaned a
winch and operator to a stevedore engaged in unloading a ship which be-
longed to the general employer. In spite of the fact that the winchman
took his signals from the special employer, the general employer was held
liable. A very similar fact situation was before an Ohio court of appeals
in Redmond v. Republic Steel.3 The general employer was held liable.
Although the courts do not talk in terms of presumptions in this area,
the results dearly indicate that in these cases of divided control the pre-
sumption is that the general employer is liable.
Course of Employment
As a general rule, if a servant is ostensibly acting for his master and
within the indicated limits of space and time, the servant is in the course
of his employment, although he has an intent to deviate from his route.
Thus in Clawson v. Pierce-Arrow Co.,4 the servant was told to deliver the
employer's car to a repair garage. The accident happened on the way
to the garage and the employer was held liable, even though the servant
testified he did not intend to stop at the garage, but intended to continue
beyond it on a "frolic and detour" of his own. As a policy matter, the
Clawson case was correctly decided by the New York court, because the
only evidence of the deviation was subjective evidence of the servant him-
self, who was under some economic pressure from the employer. A re-
cent Ohlo case points out that in the same situation, if there is sufficient
objective evidence of the intent to deviate, the result should be otherwise.
In Thornberry v. Oyler Bros. Inc.,5 the servant was told to drive an empty
'The exception is Pennsylvania where both masters are held. See MECHEM, OUT-
LINEs oF AGENCY 311 (4th ed. 1952).
2212 U.S. 215 (1909).
'131 N.E.2d 593 (Ohio App. 1956).
'231 N.Y. 273, 131 N.E. 914 (1921).
6164 OHio ST. 395, 131 N.E.2d 383 (1955).
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